Gender Ideologies in Violent Extremism: A Comparative Analysis of the Islamic State and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK)
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Elijah Wuntimah Mbawini
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Elijah Wuntimah MbawiniIntroduction
Extremist groups gain a major advantage from women’s involvement, especially online, where they help spread radical ideologies, recruit others, and influence their friends and families. AAs technology evolves, it creates more space for women to take on active and sometimes leading roles in these networks. Despite this, counterterrorism strategies and policymakers often overlook women’s roles in both supporting and carrying out violent activities, giving extremist groups the upper hand in utilizing their participation (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2019).
“While violence and conflict are shaped by economic, political and cultural contexts, they are also deeply gendered” Parpart, Zalewski and Parpart, 2008, p. 181) emphasize. Lorber (2000, p. 1057) also argues that gender fills every corner of social life and the structures we build around it and plays a pivotal role in constructing narratives. In terrorism studies, understanding the link between gender and violence gives critical view into recruitment strategies and ideological foundations and differences of these terrorist organizations. Researchers like (McKay, 2005; Ness, 2005; Cunningham, 2007; Von Knop, 2007; Shapiro and Maras, 2019; Bodziany and Netczuk-Gwoździewicz, 2021) have studied broadly about the roles of women in terrorism and found out that women involvement either as supporters, ideological sympathizers, fighters or suicide bombers, challenges traditional gender roles but are still tactically used by these groups. Feminist critiques of the just war tradition have gone further to show that the concept of war is constructed according to old-fashioned traditional gender norms, where men are seen as the natural warriors and women are viewed as innocent civilians and must be protected (Sjoberg 2009, p. 152). As Sjoberg (2018, p. 61) later noted, feminist approaches to the study of conflict has given us deeper understanding into why wars begin and how they affect people.
In this essay, I will conduct a comparative analysis of gender ideologies in two well-known extremist organizations. The IS and PKK were chosen because of the easy availability and accessibility of resources such as modules weekly class readings and external readings online. The Islamic State (IS), which emerged from Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2006, promotes a tight, patriarchal interpretation of Islamic law that confines women to domestic and reproductive roles. On the other hand, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) shaped by Kurdish nationalism and Marxist‑Leninist ideas, places women’s liberation at the heart of its struggle. Although the PKK claimed to champion women’s emancipation as central to its struggle for self-determination, its practical experience also exposed many contradictions. Both organizations used gender as a weapon to serve their political and strategic ends, but they go about it in different ways.
The Islamic State’s Gender Ideology: Strict Patriarchy and Dual Exploitation
Historical and Ideological Foundations
The Islamic State, also known as ad-Dawlah or Daesh, emerged officially on 13 October 2006 as a successor to the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), an umbrella organization connected to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Bunzel, 2015). Under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, IS was first known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) before evolving into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and finally rebranding itself as the Islamic State (IS) on 29 June 2014 under Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (Bunzel, 2015). With aspirations that went beyond Iraq and Syria, IS proclaimed itself a worldwide caliphate and set up branches in places like Africa, including Congo, Mozambique, and Uganda (also known as the Central Africa Province) and in Afghanistan (Wilayah Khorasan).
IS’s ideological roots lie in Salafi-jihadism, a fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam that seeks to revive what its followers believe as the pure and unfiltered practices of early Muslims. According to IS, women are the moral core of the Ummah (Islamic society) and are largely in charge of taking care of the home and having children. They are mainly responsible for creating and raising the next generation of jihadist fighters, often known as “the cubs of the caliphate” or “ashbal al-Khliafah” (Silva Sanchez, 2018). Portraying womanhood in this light is deeply ideological as IS insists it is a sacred duty mandated by its reading of Sharia law.
Systems Used to Control and Spread Propaganda
The Islamic State lays out its expectations for women in official documents by deploying the Al‑Khansaa Brigade, which is an all‑female police unit in charge of patrolling neighborhoods to enforce its strict rules on how women must dress and behave. For example, the “City Document,” which was released by the IS media office in Nineveh Governorate, paints a picture of the ideal woman, describing the ideal Islamic State accepted and approved woman as modest, fully covered, and confined to the home except in cases of real necessity (Hassen, 2021). Another document titled, “Women in the Islamic State” issued on 23 January 2015 makes it clear that a woman’s primary duty is to be a wife and a mother, a role seen as very necessary in raising the caliphate’s next generation of jihadists (Hassen, 2021). These texts strengthen the view that female domesticity is not a matter of personal choice and also that a woman’s place in the household is but a religious obligation designed to support the caliphate’s wider ideological and state-building goals (Bloom, 2011).
Exploitation through Gendered Violence and DeceptiveRecruitment
IS’s gender ideology is full of deadly contradictions. On one hand, the group has put countless women to brutal treatment by locking them away, torturing them, sexually violating them, and even carrying out mass executions. Yet, IS has been able to attract a surprising number of female recruits by exploiting the vulnerability of marginalized women and offering them a sense of belonging and purpose in the the so called “caliphate”, a strategy that romanticizes the whole wife of caliphate idea, thereby drawing more women into its ranks than previous terrorist organizations ever managed (Spencer, 2016). The main IS’s strategy is its brutal and yet calculated use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. The kidnap and enslavement of Yazidi women and girls, backed by religious rulings and sanctioned by the fatwas, became a hallmark of IS’s military campaign. These fatwas gave fighters the green light to capture, traffic, and rape non-Sunni women whom they called “infidel”, under the guise of divine approval or divinely sanctioned (Beck, 2015). Survivor of these acts bitterly recall and document the organized instances of gang rape, forced conversions at gunpoint and the psychological torture designed to terrorize, shatter and demoralize entire communities. Through these disgusting acts, IS sought not just to spread fear but to rewrite cultural identities by forcibly assimilating non-Muslim women into the caliphate and turn women into unwilling symbols of conquest.
In IS territories, they enforce strict rules of gender inequality. Women were restricted from appearing in public places without being escorted by a male guardian, denied access to employment and education beyond elementary religious instruction, and confined to domestic roles. These restrictions were enforced by units like the Al-Khansaa Brigade which patrolled streets and neighborhoods to make sure no woman broke these regulations (Hassen, 2021). At the same time, IS ran advanced online recruitment propaganda targeting women in the western countries and depicting life in the caliphate as spiritual pure and morally clear, in contrast to the rotten morals of the western societies. These messages promised recruits a deep sense of purpose, religious fulfilment, and honored roles as homemakers, mothers of jihadist offspring, or even martyrs (Khader et al., 2016). Once they arrived however, many found themselves trapped in forced marriages, confined to domestic duties, and subjected to constant surveillance which is hardly the liberation they had been sold. This contrast between the seductive online promises of empowerment and the harsh reality on the ground shows how IS has exploited traditional gender roles and weaponised it for its own benefits. Women are glorified in propaganda as vital to the next generation’s rise, while their actual freedom and power are rigidly controlled and subordinated (Sjoberg, 2016).
The PKK’s Revolutionary Gender Approach: Ideals, Achievements, and Contradictions
Historical and Gender Ideological Foundations
From the moment the PKK took shape in Diyarbakır in 1978, it fused Kurdish nationalism with Marxist‑Leninist ideas to forge a new kind of movement. Abdullah Öcalan and his colleagues understood early on that winning Kurdish rights would be incomplete if women remained denied their own freedom. They introduced “Jineology” (the science of women) in 2008, a framework of radical feminist analysis which challenges centuries of male dominance by examining power relations in every corner of life, from the household to community councils, and seeks to blend the gains of Kurdish women’s activism into the wider social fabric (Schäfers and Neven, 2017). Öcalan himself insisted that no society can truly be free while about half of its population remains oppressed(Öcalan, 1991; Öcalan, n.d.a). By rejecting entrenched traditional gender roles or patriarchal customs and promoting women’s leadership in both civilian and military spheres, this vision became the foundation of the PKK’s commitment to real gender equality.
Implementation and Structural Transformation
Women did more than just fill support roles in the PKK’s struggle. The movement modified its command structure to put gender equality at its core. At the end of the 1980s for example, the Union of Kurdistan’s Patriotic Women (YJWK) was formed in 1987, giving women their first formal positions within the movement (Karayılan, 2014). As the years passed, this model expanded through the creation of bodies like the Union of Kurdistan’s Free Women (YAJK), the Kurdistan Female Workers’ Party (PJKK), the Free Women’s Party (PJA), the Kurdistan Free Women’s Party (PAJK), the Great Women’s Union (KJB) and the Community of Kurdistan’s Women (KJK) (Tekin, 2014). By 2014, nearly a third of all fighters were women. Many served in independently run units that directly challenged traditional gender norms in Kurdish regions, marking a level of female military participation rarely seen in the area (Speckhard, 2008; Özeren et al., 2014).
In addition to fighting on the front lines, PKK women took leadership roles in political meetings and helped to plan military operations as well as managing day‑to‑day affairs in the areas they controlled. As political officers, they ensured that orders and ideas flowed smoothly through every level of the organization. As military advisers, they offer knowledge and skills that shape tactics and strategy. In local communities also, they oversee education, health and municipal services, by acting as administrators who keep everything running smoothly. The PKK also put aside some reserved seats in its councils to ensure women have a real voice, and it set up bodies specifically for women to meet and make decisions together. These policies opened doors for women to become free from traditional gender roles in Kurdish society and showed that they too can hold power, make important choices, shape policies and drive real change.
Contradictions Between Revolutionary Ideals and Operational Realities
Despite impressive achievements, the PKK’s approach to gender revolution carries deep contradictions. On one hand, female participation is highly seen and celebrated in propaganda, as shown by the iconic images of female fighters and leaders. On the other hand, the real decision making power at the highest levels remains largely in the hands of men (Davis, 2013). It is clear that, although the movement claims to uphold equality, daily life in guerrilla camps still reflects traditional gender roles, showing that the promise of equality often falls short.
Further complicating the PKK’s gender policies are the operational needs of armed combat. Military discipline and operational needs sometimes defy feminist principles. For example, the group discourages romantic relationships among its members and asks pregnant women to leave active duty. Even though it has set up women’s tribunals to hear cases of sexual abuse and harassment, building an environment that truly respects gender equality within a military chain of command remains an ongoing challenge. These tensions expose how difficult it is to translate feminist ideals into a male dominated system which is structured by the harsh realities of war.
Propaganda further complicates the picture. Female fighters such as Zilan are portrayed as revolutionary “goddesses” linked to ancient myths (Çağlayan, 2016). Even with this symbolic representation, few women can climb into real leadership roles. Studies have shown that they hold under ten percent (10%) of senior positions in the organization (Davis, 2013). In effect, the PKK’s gender agenda is inspiring in theory but remains held back and restricted by long standing structural barriers.
Comparative Analysis: Contradictory Ideological Frameworks and Key Differences
A comparative study of the Islamic State and the PKK shows very different ideologies on gender roles in extremist movements. The Islamic State operates under a strict religious worldview rooted in Salafi‑jihadism and a strict reading of Sharia law. Women under IS are expected to remain at home, bear and raise children, and obey rules defined by religious duty. At the same time, the group employs a two-way strategy by combining horrible gender-based violence, such as the systematic sexual abuse of Yazidi women and girls to instill fear, with recruitment propaganda that ironically promises empowerment and portrays life in the caliphate as dignified and empowering (Khader et al., 2016; Sjoberg, 2016; Bloom, 2017; Hassen, 2021)
In contrast, the PKK places women’s freedom at center of its struggle. Inspired by Abdullah Öcalan’s concept of Jineology, which claims that true freedom for the Kurdish people cannot be won without freeing women first (Öcalan 1991; Öcalan n.d.a). The organization has restructured itself to formalize gender equality, resulting in a significant participation of women in all aspects of its operations, i.e., from combat to political governance. However, the PKK is not without its contradictions. Although the organization often promotes progressive ideals, it continues to uphold conventional gender roles, resulting in a gap between the appearance of empowerment and the actual inclusion of women in meaningful leadership positions. Long‑standing cultural attitudes can reappear sometimes and the power to make big decisions still rest on men.
Both groups turn gender into a tool for advancing their causes. In the case of the Islamic State, roles assigned to women support a harsh patriarchal order, enforced through violence and the strict policing of everyday life. The PKK takes a different angle, presenting gender equality as a core revolutionary principle and recruiting women to enlarge, and to strengthen its ranks. In each of these cases, the promise of empowerment is undermined by entrenched traditional and religious norms that marginalise women. Just as Ness (2005), Sjoberg (2009), and Alakoc (2020) have claimed, even when extremist movements rely on women’s contributions, they often end up reinforcing the same old gender hierarchies.
The contrasting strategies of the Islamic State and the PKK highlight the complex and multifaceted relationship between gender and political violence. Whereas IS uses gendered brutality to cement a rigid, theocratic hierarchy, while the PKK seeks to challenge traditional roles under the banner of revolution. In practice, however, the pressures of armed conflict allow familiar inequalities to resurface. Recognizing these differences is critical for anyone designing counter‑terrorism or peacebuilding initiatives, because without addressing gender dynamics straight forward, efforts to tackle extremist movements or to foster reconciliation will remain incomplete.
Conclusion
In conclusion, in examining gender ideologies of the Islamic State and the PKK, two very different approaches to the use of gender in extremist warfare is revealed. The Islamic State builds its entire social hierarchy around strict religious commands that trap women in the home, punish those who step outside narrowly defined boundaries and even wield sexual violence as a tool of terror. At the same time, it draws in vulnerable women with glowing promises of purpose and power. Promises that are masked and, in practice, only deepen their dependence and suffering. In contrast, the PKK has added the idea of women’s freedom into its broader call for Kurdish liberation. Women have taken up arms, led political campaigns and pushed for equal treatment at every level of the group. Even with this, deeply rooted habits die hard. Old patterns of male authority still surface once a while in day-to-day life, reminding us that revolutionary talk does not always translate into real equality on the ground.
These studies make it clear that gender is not just a small detail in extremist violence but a central battleground. If we hope to stop these cycles of brutality and rebuild societies torn apart by conflict, we must tackle the ways gender fuels political violence. Only by acknowledging and challenging both the obvious and hidden ways gender is used as a tool, can communities start to break the cycles of violence that keep extremist causes alive.
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